Pastore LLC has brought claims to thwart violations of securities laws by broker-dealers to funnel money away from a rightful beneficiary to a wrongdoer. The scheme, as alleged in the federal complaint, conducted by the broker-dealers led to violations of their supervisory responsibilities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) as well as multiple FINRA rules. Moreover, FINRA and the SEC have previously fined these broker-dealers for conducting similar schemes. A recent article regarding this matter can be found here.
Author: Kelly Somers
S.D.N.Y. Grants Pastore’s Motion for Alternative Service Against International Cryptocurrency Corporation
Pastore LLC represents a financial services company in a cryptocurrency contract dispute with a Uruguay joint-stock company with its principal place of business in Sao Paulo, Brazil. In an effort to effectuate service of process against the Uruguayan company, Pastore LLC filed a Motion for Alternative Service with the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “S.D.N.Y.”). In an order that recognized the steps Pastore LLC had taken to comply with the standards of service of process on an international corporation, the S.D.N.Y. granted the Motion for Alternative Service and has allowed Pastore LLC to effectuate service of process via e-mail. The matter involves the trading of a carbon credit crypto coin on the Gemini exchange, as a result of Pastore’s client’s relationship with the well-known founders of the exchange. A recent article regarding this matter can be found here.
Stablecoins: What are They?
A little-known area of the growing cryptocurrency market is stablecoins. Stablecoins, a type of cryptocurrency, are not mined through an open network like Bitcoin and Ethereum.[1] Instead, stablecoins derive their value from another asset.[2] Most stablecoins are pegged to a national currency.[3] For example, the USD Coin is a stablecoin that is pegged to the U.S. dollar.[4] Therefore, one USD Coin is always worth one U.S. dollar.[5] By deriving their value from a national currency, stablecoins avoid the volatility that is usually associated with cryptocurrencies.[6] Like other cryptocurrencies, stablecoins are stored in digital wallets.[7]
While Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has recognized the potential benefits of stablecoins such as “supporting beneficial payment options,” there are no regulations in place to monitor stablecoin reserves. [8] Government regulators are concerned about the implications of a relatively stable cryptocurrency that allows investors to avoid anti-money laundering (“AML”) regulations. [9] Recently, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (“PWG”), consisting of Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the chairpersons of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission, issued a report recommending Congress to pass legislation to regulate the stablecoin market.[10]
The legislation recommended by the PWG report would limit the issuance of stablecoins to insured depository institutions and establish a federal framework to regulate other parties in stablecoin arrangements, such as the party that facilitates the transfer of stablecoins between individuals and the entity that stores the stablecoins.[11] While the PWG believes the proposed legislation should be passed urgently, it recommends in the meantime that agencies use their current authority to address the risks posed by the unregulated stablecoin market.[12] Moreover, the PWG recommends that international AML standards should be implemented to prevent the use of stablecoins by illicit actors.[13]
While stablecoins are still operating in an unregulated environment, one thing is clear: the market is only continuing to grow, and the SEC and other government agencies are taking notice of the unregulated area. Common sense, sound legal advice, and diligence will help any business or investor navigate this market despite the uncertainty surrounding stablecoins.
[1] Julian Dossett, Stablecoins: What they are, how they work and how to buy them, CNET (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.cnet.com/personal-finance/crypto/stablecoins-what-they-are-how-they-work-and-how-to-buy-them/.
[2]Id.
[3] Kathryn G. Wellman; Neil T. Bloomfield, President’s working group report calls for stablecoin regulation, Reuters (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/presidents-working-group-report-calls-stablecoin-regulation-2021-12-02/.
[4] What is USD Coin? Coinbase, https://www.coinbase.com/usdc (last visited Dec. 28, 2021).
[5]Id.
[6] Wellman; Bloomfield, note 3.
[7] Dossett, note 1.
[8] Felicia Hou, Stablecoins are taking over the crypto world hot topic for Congress—here’s what they are and the fastest-rising ones to keep an eye on, Fortune (Dec. 8, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/12/08/stablecoins-cryptocurrency-congress/ (quoting Janet Yellen.
[9] Wellman & Bloomfield, note 3.
[10] Id.
[11] President’s Working Grp. on Fin. Mkts., the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., & the Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Report on Stablecoins (Nov. 2021).
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
Bankruptcy Court Holds the Plain Meaning of a Security Agreement Dictates
AMERINATIONAL COMMUNITY SERVICES, LLC V. AMBAC ASSURANCE CORP.: PUERTO RICO BANKRUPTCY COURT RULES THAT THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF A SECURITY AGREEMENT DICTATES
A civil action was recently disputed in which Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico (“GDB”) sought to have the obligations owed to it prioritized over the bond agreements previously executed by the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (“HTA”). The court in this case held that the “waterfall provisions” contained within the bond agreements were sufficiently specific to uphold the seniority of the bond obligations owed by HTA over the more recent obligations owed by the HTA to the GDB.
Puerto Rico (the “Commonwealth”), together with HTA began restructuring proceedings as a part of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”). At the time, HTA had roughly $4 billion in outstanding bond claims, and $2 billion in outstanding loan claims. HTA issued bonds in two parts and under bond resolutions dated 1968 and 1998. These resolutions stated that the bonds issued in 1968 had payment priority over the bonds issued in 1998, and any subsequent debt obligations undertaken by the HTA would be subordinated to both tranches of bonds.
Beginning in 2008, GDB entered into a series of intragovernmental agreements through which they loaned $2 billion to the HTA to continue their complete restructuring under PROMESA. These loans were evidenced by a series of loan agreements. Additionally, as a part of these transactions, GDB and the HTA executed an assignment and security agreement (collectively, the “Security Agreement”), pursuant to which HTA purported to assign certain excise taxes to GDB and granted a security interest in those taxes to secure GDB’s loan claims. These loan claims were later transferred to the GDB Debt Recovery Authority (“DRA”) as part of a consensual restructuring proceeding for GDB under Title VI of PROMESA. The Security Agreement was subject to Puerto Rico Acts 30 and 31 of 2012, which stated that taxed imposed must be used for the payment of principal and interest on any obligations or bonds of HTA.
In 2021, the Commonwealth filed an adjustment plan which provided that HTA bondholder’s payments were subordinate to the DRA’s payments. The collateral monitor and servicer for DRA debt filed a suit against the bondholders, stating that under Acts 30 and 31, the payments owed to them as HTA bondholders were subordinate to any payments owed to GDB under the GDB loans to the HTA.
The United States Bankruptcy Court (the “Court”) held that DRA’s claims did not subordinate HTA bonds, and the waterfall provisions dictated, despite Acts 30 and 31. The Court’s reasoning was that the Security Agreement “unambiguously prioritize[d] Bond payments by establishing a waterfall (or ‘turnover’) mechanism.” In making this observation, the Court further opined that “the plain text of the subordination provisions referred only to “outstanding bonds” issued under the bond resolutions, not to future bonds,” and thus, any debts or bonds incurred or issued subsequent to the 1968 and 1998 agreements was junior to those two initial encumbrances. The Court concluded with: “whatever distinctions may be evident or reasonably inferred in other contexts are precluded here by the plain language of the Security Agreement.”
In this case, having found that the contractual language of the 1968 and the 1998 agreements unambiguously and affirmatively subordinated DRA’s loans to all of the bonds issued by the HTA, the Court dismissed all the counts of DRA’s complaint that sought declaratory relief to prioritize their loans over HTA’s bond obligations.
Id. at *6.
Id. Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187 (2016).
What’s in a Name? Court Holds that Despite it’s Title, a Security Agreement Also Subordinated Junior Creditor’s Rights to Payment, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP (Dec. 1, 2021) https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/what-s-in-a-name-court-holds-that-2869667/.
AmeriNational Community Services, LLC v. Ambac Assurance Corp. (in re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt Bd. For P.R.), Adv. Proc. No. 21-00068-LTS, 2021 WL 5121892, at *2 (Bankr. P.R. Oct. 29, 2021).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *8.
Connecticut’s Data Privacy Breach Notification Law Gets a Facelift
As of October 1, 2021, Connecticut’s Data Privacy Breach Notification Act’s (“Act”) Amendments (“Amendments”) are in effect. P.A. No. 21-59. The Amendments:
Expand the definition of “personal information;”
Create extraterritorial jurisdiction;
Remove the safe harbor provision while conducting an investigation;
Lower the notification period from ninety to sixty days;
Further detail notification methods and procedures; and
Create safe harbors for those in compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA) and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH).
The new definition of personal information will require businesses to examine the types of data it stores and how it is stored. The expanded definition of personal information now includes taxpayer identification numbers, IRS issued identity protection personal identification numbers, passport numbers, military identification numbers or any other commonly issued government identification numbers – in conjunction with the first name or initial and last name of the individual.
Businesses storing COVID-19 vaccination records will also need consider the new definition because it expands coverage to medical information. The expanded definition now includes medical information regarding an individual’s medical history, conditions (mental or physical), treatment, diagnosis; identifiers used by Health Insurance companies and biometric data – in conjunction with the first name or initial and last name of the individual.
The Amendments also define a breach of security as including the disclosure of a username and password combination including an e-mail address or security question and answer that would provide online access to an account. The Amendments require, in the event of a breach of login credentials, that (1) a notice informing the person whose information was breached to promptly change their credentials on other websites using the same credentials and (2) not to rely on an email account that was part of the breach to make such notice.
The Amendments remove the limitations that required that: (1) persons subject to the Act must conduct business in Connecticut and (2) that the information subject to the Act be maintained in the ordinary course of business. Theoretically, any business that stores personal information of a Connecticut resident is now subject to the Act.
The Amendments remove the safe harbor provision allowing for an investigation after discovery of the breach before notification. Companies now have only sixty-days from the discovery of the breach of security to notify Connecticut residents. The Act also now includes an ongoing notification duty to Connecticut residents as well.
The notification of affected persons may be avoided if after an “appropriate investigation” the person covered by the Act determines that no harm will befall the individual whose personal information was either acquired or accessed. However, the sixty-day notification period still applies and any “appropriate investigation” would need to be completed before the duty to notify is triggered. Furthermore, the Act no longer requires that the information be both acquired and accessed. Simple acquisition is enough as well as is a brief intrusion into unencrypted protected personal information stored on a secured network.
Finally, the Amendments create a safe harbor for persons in compliance with HITECH and HIPPA privacy and security standards so long as notice to the attorney general is provided. Materials and information provided to the attorney general are exempt from public disclosure except when provided by the attorney general to third parties for the purpose of furthering an investigation.
The Amended Data Privacy Breach Notification Act is much more onerous to comply with and best practices include having a breach notification plan that can be used at a moment’s notice, creating an inventory of personal information stored by the entity and, encrypting all personal data. Encrypting personal information remains the best way to comply with Act but the risk of non-compliance can be high since non-compliance is considered a Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices violation which can result in compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney’s fees.
Second Circuit Affirms Jury Verdict Win for Pastore’s Hedge Fund Clients
The Second Circuit Affirms Jury Verdict Win for Pastore’s Hedge Fund Clients in Multimillion-dollar Securities Fraud Case Brought by Billionaire Family Office
On November 15, 2021, the Second Circuit affirmed a jury verdict obtained by Pastore in a federal securities fraud case. This concluded a contentious, multi-year litigation, defeating claims of fraudulent inducement and securities fraud brought against two hedge fund executives by a billionaire family office special purpose investment vehicle. The billionaire family office, the heirs to and founders of a well-known apparel store, had invested in the fund’s General Partner limited liability company.
In 2018, The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The summary judgment was subsequently appealed up to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, before being remanded back to, and concluding with, a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. Pastore LLC was hired for the trial. After two weeks of evidence and 7 hours of jury deliberation, Pastore LLC was able to secure a favorable jury verdict for the clients. The jury had found in favor of the defense on a federal securities claim.
Then, the billionaire family office appealed the jury verdict to the Second Circuit and argued that it was entitled to a new trial because, it alleged, the district court’s abuse of discretion had a prejudicial impact on the jury’s verdict. Among other alleged errors, the billionaire family office alleged that evidence concerning a billion-dollar company investment agreement with one of the world’s largest private equity funds should be excluded. The Second Circuit stated, “the district court instructed the jury ‘the entity that holds an interest in a security suffers an economic loss if the investment experiences a decline in value.’ App’x 559. In other words, the district court instructed the jury that it should find that…suffered an economic loss if it determined that…owned the investment interest in…, regardless of the source of investment funds, and that this investment declined in value.”
Application of Business Interruption Insurance to Losses from COVID-19
In the continued legal battle over whether business interruption insurance policies cover business losses due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a recent case in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (the “Connecticut District Court”) adds to the debate. Generally, business interruption insurance covers losses resulting from the closure of the property due to some physical damage or loss to the business premises. In terms of losses incurred from the COVID-19 pandemic, policyholders have argued that the revenue lost from the closure of their businesses is covered by the business interruption insurance. However, insurers have argued that exclusions such as a Virus Exclusion provision prevent any claims resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. The recent case in the Connecticut District Court provides a great illustration of this ongoing fight for coverage between the insurance industry and business.
In the case One40 Beauty Lounge LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 3:20-cv-00643 (KAD), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216320 (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2021), One40 Beauty Lounge, LLC (“One40”) filed a class action against Sentinel Insurance Company (“Sentinel”), claiming the losses it sustained from closing its business due to the COVID-19 pandemic were covered by its insurance policy (the “Policy”) with Sentinel.[1] Sentinel moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground the Virus Exclusion provision of the Policy unambiguously excluded coverage of any losses resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.[2] Judge Kari Dooley acknowledged that she was not examining the issue of whether the Virus Exclusion provision prevented One40 from making a claim under the Policy in a vacuum because other courts had previously examined identical provisions and found it to be unambiguous.[3]
One40 argued that even if the Virus Exclusion provision prevented coverage, a subsection of the Virus Exclusion provision allowed limited coverage for 30 days of losses.[4] However, Judge Dooley stated that the subsections of the Virus Exclusion provision must be read together.[5] When viewed as a whole, the subsection One40 relied upon did not provide One40 with limited coverage for 30 days.[6] Since the Virus Exclusion provision unambiguously applied to prevent coverage for losses resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, Judge Dooley granted Sentinel’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
While the Connecticut District Court ruled that Virus Exclusion provisions prevent coverage for losses from the COVID-19 pandemic, coverage of business losses from the pandemic is still an open issue. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to ebb and flow and impacts daily business procedures, policyholders will most likely continue to seek coverage for lost revenue resulting from the closure of their businesses.
[1]One40 Beauty Lounge LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 3:20-cv-00643 (KAD), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216320 (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2021).
[2]Id. at *1.
[3]Id. at *7.
[4]Id. at *8.
[5]Id. at *11.
[6]Id.
[7]Id. at *12.
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, COVID-19, and the New Potential Systematic Risk
A commercial mortgage-backed security (“CMBS”) is a group of bonds comprised of commercial real estate loans commonly contained in trusts which are then sold to investors.[1] As of 2020, the largest loan contributors to the CMBS market include large banks, such as Citibank, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America.[2] The commercial property loans securitized by CMBS are generally compromised of commercial properties such as apartment buildings, hotels, factories, office buildings and parks, or shopping malls.[3] These bundles of bonds are also referred to as tranches.[4] CMBS loans are ranked – those with the highest rating have the lowest risk, and those with the lowest rating have the highest risk.[5] Lower risked bonds are known as senior issue, and higher risk bonds are known as junior issue.[6] After the bonds are sold, the bank receives the money from the sale.[7] The bank then lends these proceeds to a subsequent borrower to collect additional fees.[8]
Investing in CMBS poses a lower risk to borrowers than a residential mortgage-backed security (“RMBS”) loan because commercial mortgages typically have a fixed term.[9] CMBS loans are also compromised of fewer loans than RMBS loans.[10] Many investors seek out this loan because they are interested in obtaining property for an extended period of time and CBMS loans provide lower interest rates.[11] Other incentives of CMBS loans include a higher leverage financing, and CMBS loans are nonrecourse loans, and thus have a wider range of accessibility, because investors with lower credit are more readily able to obtain these loans. [12]
Although there are numerous advantages of CMBS loans, there are several disadvantages tied to a CMBS loan investment. First, these loans have prepayment penalties, which penalize a borrower for paying back a loan outside of the fixed term, even in the circumstance where the borrower pays the loan back earlier than the predetermined date.[13] Second, CMBS loans go through a defeasance profess before prepayment, which can be a painstaking process involving the borrower consulting with a financial advisor in order to set up alternative securities to replace any collateral and interest that the lender no longer is obligated to.[14] Lastly, the terms of CMBS loans are more difficult to negotiate, and a borrower has little or no say in the terms of the loans.[15]
The CMBS market has been greatly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. A shift towards working from home has created a failure of roughly $5.5 billion commercial mortgage loans since the summer of 2020.[16] The delinquency rate of CMBS loans in June 2020 was reported to be 10.32%. [17] The delinquency rate continued to increase during October of 2020, during the second wave of the pandemic.[18] The trends of CMBS loans due to the financial crisis that the pandemic has caused are almost identical to the trends of CMBS loans during the 2012 financial crisis, which poses an alarming issue when considering the impact the 2012 crisis had on the CMBS market.[19] The rise of delinquency rates is directly correlated to the effects that COVID-19 has had on commercial real estate: apartment owners, retail owners, restaurants, and hotels are bringing in substantially less income, and are left unable to pay mortgage and other commercial property-related debts.[20]
The last financial crisis in 2012 led to grave delinquencies in the CMBS market, which may signal that the CMBS market will undergo similar disruption in the future, indicative of a similar systemic risk.[21] However, much has been learned from former financial crises and the risks they pose on all types of mortgage backed-security loans, to avoid unnecessary risk in the CMBS market. Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which affects CMBS by “including risk-retention requirements for asset-backed security sponsors, increased disclosure requirements, the Volcker Rule and enhanced capitalization requirements for banks.”[22]
These protective measures are an attempt to make the CMBS market a safer space for investors by decreasing the systematic risk that the CMBS market decline may have on the overall economy.[23] An unforeseen consequence has been an increase in the price of entry into the CMBS market which affects retail investors, and aspects such as the Volcker Rule, which decreases market liquidity and restricts proprietary trading by preventing a bank from holding inventories of secondary market securities and disallowing a banks from investing in real estate.[24]
While the effects from the COVID-19 pandemic may affect the CMBS market and make these loans less accessible to borrowers, overall, the Dodd-Frank reforms have likely mitigated a majority of the risk to the CMBS market directly tied to COVID-19 and will provide a lasting benefit by decreasing this systematic risk impacting the overall economy.
[1] Owen Haney, The Virus, Risk, and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities: Examining Dodd-Frank’s Impact in the Midst of a Pandemic, 26 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 391, 394 (2021)
[2]Id.
[3]Carol M. Kopp, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), Investopedia, (October 25, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cmbs.asp
[4]Thomas Kenny, What are Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities?, The Balance, (October 7, 2021), https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-commercial-mortgage-backed-securities-cmbs-416910
[5]Id.
[6]Id.
[7]Id.
[8]Id.
[9]Carol M. Kopp, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), Investopedia, (October 25, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cmbs.asp
[10]Maegan E. O’Rourke, The New Normal: How the Dodd-Frank Risk Retention Rules Affect the Future of CMBS, 51 Suffolk Univ. L. Rev. 77, 81-82 (2018).
[11]Understanding CMBS and CLO Markets, Signet Investments, “https://signetinvestments.com/understanding-cmbs-and-clo-markets/” https://signetinvestments.com/understanding-cmbs-and-clo-markets/ (Last visited November 6 2021)
[12]Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS): A guide, Quicken Loans (January 27, 2021), https://www.quickenloans.com/learn/cmbs
[13]Id.
[14]Id.
[15]Id.
[16]Dorothy Neufield, Commercial Mortgage Delinquencies Near Record Levels, Visual Capitalist (July 16, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mortgage-delinquencies/
[17]U.S. CMBS Delinquencies Resume Increase in October, Fitch Ratings (November 6, 2020), “https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structured-finance/us-cmbs-delinquencies-resume-increase-in-october-06-11-2020” https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structured-finance/us-cmbs-delinquencies-resume-increase-in-october-06-11-2020
[18]Id.
[19]Owen Haney, The Virus, Risk, and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities: Examining Dodd-Frank’s Impact in the Midst of a Pandemic, 26 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 391, 394 (2021)
[20] Peter J. Irwin et al., CMBS Loan Workouts During COVID-19: A Borrower’s Perspective, Debevoise & Plimpton (May 14, 2020), https://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/05/20200514-cmbs-loan-workouts-during-covid-19.pdf https://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/05/20200514-cmbs-loan-workouts-during-covid-19.pdf
[21]Steven L. Schwarcz, Systematic Regulation of Systematic Risk, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2019).
[22]Owen Haney, The Virus, Risk, And Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities: Examining Dodd-Frank’s Impact in the Midst of a Pandemic, 26 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 391, 401 (2021)
[23]Craig Furfine, The Impact of Risk Retention Regulation on the Underwriting of Securitized Mortgages, 58 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH. 91, 93 (2020).
[24]Volcker Rule, The Real Estate Round Table https://www.rer.org/policy-issues/capital-credit/volcker-rule https://www.rer.org/policy-issues/capital-credit/volcker-rule (Last visited November 6, 2021)
Federal Jury Rules Four Cryptocurrency products are not Securities
A recent decision in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut appears to be the first of its kind in the nation. In the case Audet et al v. Garza et al, a federal jury recently weighed in on whether cryptocurrency products were considered securities.[1] The jury held that four digital-asset products linked to cryptocurrency were not securities.[2]
In the case, a class of customers brought an action against GAW Miners LLC (“GAW Miners”) and ZenMiner LLC (“ZenMiner”) for running a cryptocurrency Ponzi scheme.[3] When GAW Miners and ZenMiner were faced with demands from customers for the physical cryptocurrency mining equipment which they could not meet, GAW Miners and ZenMiner turned to Hashlets, Hashpoints, Paycoin and HashStakers (collectively the “Digital Assets”). [4] These Digital Assets provided customers with a portion of the computing power without owning the physical hardware.[5] Moreover, the Digital Assets served as virtual wallets for the promissory notes and virtual currency of GAW Miners and ZenMiner.[6] The plaintiffs argued that these Digital Assets were investment contracts and therefore were unregulated securities.[7]
The plaintiffs asked Judge Michael Shea to rule as a matter of law that the Digital Assets were securities under the Howey test. [8] The Supreme Court in Howey stated an investment contract exists when “a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.” [9] However, in an unusual decision, Judge Shea declined to rule as a matter of law that the Digital Assets were securities.[10] Instead, the judge left the issue of how to classify the Digital Assets for the jury.[11] Despite the SEC previously referring to one of the Digital Assets, Hashlets, as a security in a case against one of the former defendants in this case,[12] the jury ruled that the Digital Assets were not investment contracts, and therefore, they were not securities.[13]
The issue of how to define cryptocurrencies is an ongoing debate, and the federal jury’s ruling in this case does not settle it.
[1] Elise Hansen, Crypto Mining-Linked Products Weren’t Securities, Jury Finds, Law360 (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1436790/crypto-mining-linked-products-weren-t-securities-jury-finds.
[2] Id.
[3] HHR Wins Groundbreaking Jury Verdict in Crypto Fraud Trial, HHR (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.hugheshubbard.com/news/hhr-wins-groundbreaking-jury-verdict-in-crypto-fraud-trial.
[4] Id.
[5] Hansen, supra note 1.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Alison Frankel, In apparent first, Conn. class action jury finds crypto products are not securities, Reuters (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/apparent-first-conn-class-action-jury-finds-crypto-products-are-not-securities-2021-11-03/.
[9] SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] HRR, supra note 3.
[13] Hansen, supra note 1.
Pastore Wins Payout for Large Investment Bank After Cross-Country Federal Court Litigation Saga
Pastore LLC has won multiple complex securities and M&A actions arising from a derivative rights holder agreement and related investment banking engagement agreements that secured its client’s indemnification rights. This brings an end to the saga between the Defendant, a large investment banking firm, and the Plaintiff, a representative of the shareholders to a company seeking to invalidate investment banking fees owed following a series of complex insurance corporate mergers.
After first securing its investment banking client’s indemnification rights, Pastore LLC successfully defended its client against a multimillion-dollar suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, obtaining a dismissal of the Plaintiff’s action. After Plaintiff appealed the District of Nebraska’s decision to dismiss the case, Pastore LLC successfully defended its client before the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court ruling in Pastore LLC’s clients’ favor that Plaintiff-Appellants lacked standing.
Plaintiff then brought his same claims against Pastore LLC’s client in the District Court of Delaware only to have the investment bank, yet again, successfully obtain a dismissal of Plaintiff’s action. Pastore LLC’s first Motion to Dismiss in the Delaware District Court action caused Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint. Its second Motion to Dismiss was granted by the District Court. In its Memorandum Opinion, the District Court agreed that Plaintiff’s claims were batted by the doctrine of res judicata and that the Plaintiff lacked standing to assert its claims.
As a result of the litigation between the Plaintiff and Pastor LLC’s client, from the District of Nebraska to the Eight Circuit and then again in the District of Delaware, Pastore LLC secured its client’s indemnification rights, which included Pastore LLC’s legal fees, and obtained a large payout for its client.
Pastore LLC attorneys have vast experience arguing and defending matters in various federal courts across the country and are well-situated to handle similar claims involving complex contractual and investment banking issues.