The Treasury Report of Regulations Being Considered for Removal or Revision

Pursuant to Executive Order 13789,  IRS and Treasury have been reviewing tax regulations issued since  January 1, 2016 with an eye toward regulations that:

  • Impose an undue financial burden on US taxpayers
  • Add undue complexity to the US tax laws; or
  • Exceed the statutory authority of the IRS

In a Notice released July 7, 2017, Treasury issued its first conclusions identifying eight regulations that they felt met the announced criteria. Now, in a second report, this one dated October 2, 2017, Treasury has announced its recommended actions on those regulations.

This note offers a brief roadmap of the October 2 report.

Of the 105 temporary, proposed, and final regulations issued between January 1, 2016 and April 21, 2017, Treasury identified eight which they believe meet at least one of the first two criteria of the Executive Order. Treasury also notes in its October report that they are also considering unstated reforms to regulations under Section 871(m) (related to payments treated as U.S. Source dividends) and under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.

Treasury has identified two proposed regulations to be withdrawn, three temporary or final regulations to be revoked in substantial part, and three regulations to be substantially revised. I will summarize these proposed changes in order.

 

  1.   There are two proposed regulations proposed to be withdrawn entirely. These include:
  2. Proposed Regulations under Section 2704 concerning restrictions on liquidation of an interest for Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes. Section 2704 addresses the valuation of interests in family controlled entities, for purposes of wealth transfer tax. In some cases, Section 2704 treats lapses of voting or liquidations rights as if they were transfers for gift and estate tax purposes.

The goal of the proposed regulations was to respond to developments in state statutes and case law which had reduced the applicability of Section 2704 and enabled certain family entities to generate artificially high valuation discounts for such characteristics as lack of control and marketability.  By depressing the values of assets this way, taxpayers can depress the value of property for gift and estate tax purposes. Some comments on the regulations indicated that it is not practicable to value an interest in a closely held entity as if there were no restrictions on withdrawal or liquidation in the organization’s governing documents or state law simply because such a hypothetic environment does not exist.

Treasury now concludes that the approach of the proposed regulations to the issue of artificial valuation discounts is “unworkable” and plans to publish a withdrawal of the associated regulations in their entirety.

  1. Prosed Regulations under Section 103 concerning the definition of a Political Subdivision. Section 103 of the Code excludes from a taxpayer’s gross income the interest on state or local bonds, including obligations of political subdivisions. The proposed regulations called for such a political subdivision, for this purpose, to possess not only sovereign power, but also to meet certain tests to demonstrate a governmental purpose and governmental control.

While Treasury continues to express the belief that some enhanced standards for qualifying as a governmental entity are needed to suit the purposes of Code Section 103, it expresses the conclusion that, in the context of the extensive impact on existing legal structures of Section 103, the proposed regulations are not justified.

 

  1.   Regulations Treasury may consider revoking in part. These include the following three final, proposed, and temporary regulations:
  2. Final Regulations under Section 7602 on the Participation of a Person Described in Section 6103(n) in a Summons Interview. The final regulations allow the IRS to use private contractors to assist the IRS in auditing taxpayers. This participation includes the authority of the Service to allow the private contractor to “participate fully” in IRS interviews of taxpayers and other witnesses, including witnesses under oath. The regulation also allows private contractors to review records received in response to a summons. These regulation were first promulgated as temporary regulation in 2014, then finalized in 2016.

Only two comments were received on these regulations. However, the regulations were not well-received by the public. One federal court observed that such a practice “may lead to further scrutiny by Congress” (U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. 154 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1143 (W.D. Washington 2015). Thereafter, the Senate Finance Committee approved legislation that would prohibit IRS from using private contractors in a summons proceeding for any purpose.

Treasury now takes the position that it may consider amending these regulations with only prospective effect. Such an amendment would serve to prohibit the IRS from using outside legal counsel in an examination or a summons interview. Outside attorneys would not be permitted question witnesses or be involved in a back office capacity such as reviewing summoned records or consulting on IRS legal strategy. IRS will continue to use outside subject matter experts such as economists, engineers, and authorities on foreign legal matters.

  1. Regulations under Sections 707 and 752 on Treatment of Partnership Liabilities. These regulations include:
  • Proposed and Temporary Regulations addressing allocation of liabilities for purposes of the disguised sale rules; and
  • Proposed and Temporary Regulations treating so-called “bottom dollar” guarantees and generally disallowing such guarantees for purposes of calculating a partner’s liability in the context of liability allocation

The first set of rules, dealing with liability allocation in evaluating a disguised sale, effectively renders all liabilities for these purposes as nonrecourse liabilities. Treasury acknowledges that this characterization technique is “novel” and allows that it is “considering whether the proposed and temporary regulations relating to disguised sales should be revoked and the prior regulations reinstated.”

The prior, proposed regulations were largely a codification of the IRS arguments in Canal Corporation v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199 (2010) where the Tax Court held that a partner’s guarantee in the context of a so-called “leveraged partnership” transaction should not be respected where the partner-guarantor was undercapitalized vis-a-vis the liability and had no contractual requirement to maintain a minimum net worth. The 2014 regulations had their own cumbersome qualities, many of which were intended to be resolved by the 2016 regulations.

Treasury indicates even less willingness to change the proposed and temporary bottom dollar regulations. After an extended recitation of the perceived problems arising from non-commercial guarantees, Treasury concludes that “the temporary regulations are needed to prevent abuses and do not meaningfully increase regulatory burdens of the taxpayers affected.”  Accordingly, Treasury does not plan to review the bottom dollar guarantee regulations.

  1. Final and Temporary Regulations under Section 385 on the Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness.

These regulations generally include two categories of rules:

  • Rules establishing minimum documentation requirements that must usually be satisfied before claimed debt obligations between related parties can be treated as debt for federal tax purposes (known as the “Documentation Regulations”); and
  • Rules that treat as stock debt that is issued by a corporation to a controlling shareholder in a distribution or in another related party transaction that achieves an economically similar result (known as the “Distribution Regulations”).

The Documentation Regulations apply principally to domestic issuers and establish minimum characteristics of a transaction whereby its tax posture can be evaluated.

The Distribution Regulations generally affect interests issued to related parties who are non-U.S. holders and serve to limit earnings-stripping, whether by way of inversions or foreign takeovers.

Treasury now proposes to:

  1. Revoke the Documentation Regulations in their entirety, followed by introduction of new regulations at a later date; and
  2. Retain the Distribution Regulations in anticipation of reforms to the Internal Revenue Code.

 

III.   Regulations Treasury May Consider Substantially Revising

Treasury has identified two Final Regulations and a Temporary Regulation for consideration for revision:

  1. Final Regulations under Code Section 367 on the Treatment of Certain Transfers of Property to Foreign Corporations.

Section 367 of the Code imposes a tax on transfers of property to foreign corporations, subject to certain exceptions, including an exception for property transferred for use in the active conduct of a trade or business outside of the United States.

These regulations eliminate the ability of taxpayers to transfer foreign goodwill and going concern value to a foreign corporation without incurring tax. The rules provide no exception for an active trade or business.

Treasury now argues that “an exception to the current regulations may be justified by both the structure of the statute and its legislative history.” Treasury, through the Office of Tax Policy, is proposing to expand the active trade or business exception to include relief for outbound transfers of foreign goodwill and going concern value attributable to a foreign branch under circumstances with limited potential for abuse and, curiously, administrative difficulties. The notion that making regulations controlling outbound transfers of foreign goodwill which simultaneously maximize simplicity and minimize risk of abuse, while noble in the articulation, has historically proven more aspirational than practical.

  1. Temporary Regulations under Section 337(d) on Certain Transfers of Property to Regulated Investment Companies (RICs) and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)

The Temporary Regulations amend existing rules on transfers of property by C corporations to RICs and REITs. The regulations also govern application of the PATH Act to spinoff transactions involving disqualification of nonrecognition treatment for C corporation property transferred to REITs. Treasury now believes that the REIT spinoff rules could result in over-inclusion of gain in some circumstances. This might be particularly problematic, Treasury says, when a large corporation acquires a small corporation that had engaged in a Section 355 spin-off and the large corporation then makes a REIT election.

Treasury now concludes that the temporary regulations may produce too much taxable gain in some cases. Hence, Treasury is considering proposing caps in situations where, because of the predecessor and successor rule in Reg. Section 1.337(d)-7T(f)(2), gain recognition is required in excess of the amount that would have been recognized if a party to a spin off had directly transferred assets to a REIT.

  1. Final Regulations under Section 987 on Income and Currency Gain or Loss with Respect to a Section 987 Qualified Business Unit

These final regulations govern:

  • Translation protocols forincome from branch operations conducted in a currency that differs from the owner’s functional currency;
  • Calculating foreign currency gain or loss with respect to the branch’s financial assets and liabilities; and
  • Recognizing foreign currency gain or loss when the branch makes certain transfers of property to its owner

The Treasury report states that these regulations “have proved difficult to apply for many taxpayers.” While this explanation meets none of the criteria advanced by the Executive Order, Treasury proposes as a solution to “defer application of Regulations Sections 1.987-1 through 1.987-10 until at least 2019.” It is unclear how delay of application of the regulations will respond either to the problem identified by Treasury or to the Executive Order.

Treasury takes its response to the subject regulations a couple of steps further. Treasury declares its intent to propose modifications to the final regulations to adopt a simplified method of translating and calculating Section 987 gains and losses, subject to unspecified timing limitations.  By way of example, the Report suggests rules that would treat all assets and liabilities of a Section 987 qualified business unit (QBU) as marked items and translate all items of income and expense at the average exchange rate for the year. Section 989 of the Code defines a QBU as “any separate and clearly identified unit of a trade or business of a taxpayer which maintains separate books and records.” The goal identified for this change is rendering Section 987 gain and loss consistent with currency translation gain and loss under applicable financial accounting rules and well as under the proposed Section 987 regulations proposed in 1991.

Treasury further proposes to limit a taxpayer’s Section 987 losses to the extent of its net Section 987 gains recognized in prior or subsequent years. The Report makes no reference to any proposed time limitation for this carryback and carryforward device.

  1.   Conclusion

The October 2, 2017 Treasury Report further identifying the regulations whore removal or revision answer Executive Order 13789 appears to apply uneven and incomplete standards for those choices, and promulgate a strategy for revision and removal that may not yield, in the final analysis, a reduction in the number or complexity of  the tax regulations.

Counsel should, in any event, be aware of the changes proposed in the Report to appropriately anticipate the substantial revision in the legal landscape proposed by Treasury.

Paul V. May Joins Pastore & Dailey as Counsel

Pastore & Dailey Managing Partner Joseph M. Pastore III announced today that Paul V. May will be joining the Firm as Counsel, concentrating on securities regulatory, enforcement and advisory matters.

Mr. May joins the Firm from ABN AMRO Securities, where he was Chief Compliance Officer of the FINRA member firm and its affiliated entities since 2010. Previously, Mr. May served in various compliance and legal capacities at Cowen and Company, ICAP and Royal Bank of Canada Capital Markets, in the Securities Industry practice at Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, and as founding partner of Steere & May, a boutique financial services practice.

Mr. May began his legal career as an attorney in the Enforcement Division of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in New York from 1990 to 1995. He is a regular speaker at securities industry events including the SIFMA Annual Compliance and Legal Conference on topics including Preventing and Detecting Securities Fraud and Compliance Risk Assessment. He is co-author of Building an Effective Compliance Risk Assessment Program for a Financial Institution in the current issue of the Journal of Securities Operations & Custody.

Mr. May is also a founding trustee of the Holy Cross Lawyers Association and President of the Board of New Yorkers Against Gun Violence – an education and advocacy organization that encourages safe gun ownership and sensible firearms regulation.

Mr. May is a graduate of Brooklyn Law School and the College of the Holy Cross.

Mr. May is admitted to practice in New York, Connecticut, the Southern and Eastern District Courts of New York and the Supreme Court of the United States.

Mr. May can be reached by e-mail at pmay@psdlaw.net and by telephone at 646-665-2202 (office) or 516-662-7223 (mobile).

Why Tax Reform Will Not Happen Soon

Corporations have been stockpiling cash awaiting promised tax reform. Enterprises have delayed capital investment, hiring, and cash allocation in anticipation of promised tax features such as lower rates. In February of 2017, the Secretary of the Treasury promised comprehensive tax reform before the August recess.

Because tax reform along the lines or scale articulated by some in government to date seems unlikely, I encourage businesses to consider deploying their capital more profitably than holding it in reserve.

I reviewed the circumstances generally present in the environments of each of the last eight significant tax reform acts. I found three factors present in the majority of them and offer here my view of why their presence then, and their absence now, bodes poorly for sweeping tax reform.

  1. Lobbyists need to be kept at a distance or soundly aligned with the reform goals. Thus far, Congress has led with its chin by pushing such things as the Border Adjustment Tax and lower corporate tax rates. Now, K Street is already fully immersed in the process, either for or against. Neither required element of “Fair” or “Simple” is any longer possible.
  2. A government more or less evenly divided, as it was in 1986, is essential so that no one party has to suffer the fallout from substantial tax reform. Division is considered not just by party within the legislative branch, but also as between the Houses of Congress and the president. See the chart below for an illustration of how this has shaped up in years when tax reform has passed. Also, recall that within 20 years after TRA 1986, over 15,000 changes to the tax law, most incrementally rolling back the changes, had already been made.
  3. Revenue neutrality is a necessarily stated goal of tax reform. In 1986, Representatives took turns at the podium declaring their support for a bill that neither raised nor lowered government revenues. With a current budget deficit of about $440 billion, a tax gap of about $410 billion, and the largest income polarization in history, it’s going to be a tough sell to offer revenue neutrality. Without it, there can be no meaningful tax reform.

Given that none of the factors that have been historically required to accomplish sweeping tax reform are now present, I suspect we will not see it this year or in 2018.

This memo is intended only as an illustration of general principles. It is not intended as legal or tax advice. The reader is cautioned to discuss his or her specific circumstances with a qualified practitioner before taking any action.

Tax Changes for Employees Donating Leave time to Harvey Victims

In Notice 2017-48, released on September 5, 2017, the IRS announced that employees who donate vacation, sick, or personal leave in exchange for employer contributions to charitable organizations providing relief to victims of Hurricane/Tropical Storm Harvey will not be taxed on the value of that times as income. Also, employers may deduct the amounts so donated as business expenses.

This Notice is important because it represents a suspension of the normal constructive receipt rules of taxation. Ordinarily, when an employee earns income and has the right to receive such income, he or she is subject to tax on it, even if the employee instructs the employer to give the money, instead, to some other person. The IRS has provided such suspension of the rules before, such as in the cases of Hurricane Sandy (Notice 2012-69) and Hurricane Matthew (Notice 2016-69).

The IRS has now advised it will not assert the constructive receipt doctrine over such leave donations and associated payments so long as the payments are:

  1. Paid to Code Section 170(c) charitable organizations. These are, generally, the organizations often referred to under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code;
  2. For the relief of Hurricane Harvey victims; and
  3. Paid to such organizations before January 1, 2019.

Employees who participate in a leave sharing program, sometimes called a leave “bank,” where the foregone leave is excluded from compensation for tax purposes, will not be able to claim a charitable deduction for contribution of value from such a bank.

As for employers, the IRS states in the Notice that it will allow them to treat donations from leave sharing programs as business expense under Section 162 of the Code rather than as charitable contributions under Section 170. This will allow employers donating value from leave banks to deduct that value without being subject to the several limitations on charitable contributions under Section 170.

The record keeping and reporting rules are also amended in this circumstance. Amounts representing leave sharing donations need not be included in Box 1 (wages, tips, other compensation), Box 3 (Social Security wages, as applicable), or Box 5 (Medicare wages and tips) of Form W-2.

In short, these amounts will be free from income and payroll tax withholding.

This Notice provides relief for both itemizing and non-itemizing taxpayers. A non-itemizing taxpayer who donates $2,000 worth of leave time would be able to take a deduction for $2,000. The same taxpayer would not receive the same tax benefit if he or she had taken the leave and contributed $2,000 in cash to the charity. As well, the reduction in AGI through application of the Notice provisions can make it possible for a participating employee to access a greater tax benefit among the various deductions and credits which decrease as AGI goes up. For example, a participant might be able to take a larger deduction for a contribution to a traditional IRA. On the other hand, participation in donation of leave time could yield a lower retirement plan contribution, if the employer’s plan defines wages to include the donated level and character of donated leave.

 

This memo is intended only as an illustration of general principles and is not legal or tax advice. The reader is cautioned to discuss his or her specific circumstances with a qualified professional before taking any action. In some jurisdictions, this memo may be attorney advertising.

Client Awarded Hundreds of Thousands in Legal Fees Under CUTPA

A Pastore & Dailey client has recently been awarded thousands of dollars in legal fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) in a dispute involving hedge fund founders. Pastore & Dailey, along with other attorneys, had won the trial in Connecticut State Court in 2016.

SEC Issues Report on the Application of Federal Securities Laws to Crowdfunding Through Cryptocurrency

On July 25, 2017, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a Report following their investigation of The DAO.  The DAO is an unincorporated organization that is just one example of a “Decentralized Autonomous Organization” –  a virtual organization embodied in computer code and executed on a distributed ledger or blockchain.

The DAO was formed in 2015 as unique form of crowdfunding whereby participants would vote on proposals and be entitled to rewards.  Between April and May of 2016, The DAO offered and sold approximately 1.15 billion DAO Tokens in exchange for approximately 12 million Ether.  Ether is a form of virtual currency.  These DAO Tokens gave the holder certain voting and ownership rights.

Token holders could vote on predetermined proposals deciding where The DAO invested its money, with each token holder’s vote weighted according to how many DAO Tokens he or she held.  On June 17th, 2016, an unknown individual or group attacked The DAO and appropriated approximately 1/3 of the total funds.  Although the funds were eventually recovered by The DAO, the SEC began investigating the attack and The DAO.  Ultimately, the SEC determined that an Enforcement Action was not necessary, however it issued a report laying out how the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act applies to The DAO and similar entities.

Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits entities not registered with the SEC from engaging in the offer or sale of securities in interstate commerce.  Upon investigation of the circumstances surrounding The DAO, the SEC stated that The DAO qualifies as an “issuer” and thus must register as such with the SEC in order to sell DAO Tokens – which the SEC considers to be securities – in compliance with federal securities laws.  Given the SEC’s flexible interpretation and application of the Act, this Report is a caution to virtual entities that the federal securities laws are applicable and that the SEC intends to pursue enforcement of these laws in the field of virtual currencies and securities.

SEC Issues Report on the Application of Federal Securities Laws to Crowdfunding through Cryptocurrency

On July 25, 2017, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a Report following their investigation of The DAO.  The DAO is an unincorporated organization that is just one example of a “Decentralized Autonomous Organization” –  a virtual organization embodied in computer code and executed on a distributed ledger or blockchain.

The DAO was formed in 2015 as unique form of crowdfunding whereby participants would vote on proposals and be entitled to rewards.  Between April and May of 2016, The DAO offered and sold approximately 1.15 billion DAO Tokens in exchange for approximately 12 million Ether.  Ether is a form of virtual currency.  These DAO Tokens gave the holder certain voting and ownership rights.

Token holders could vote on predetermined proposals deciding where The DAO invested its money, with each token holder’s vote weighted according to how many DAO Tokens he or she held.  On June 17th, 2016, an unknown individual or group attacked The DAO and appropriated approximately 1/3 of the total funds.  Although the funds were eventually recovered by The DAO, the SEC began investigating the attack and The DAO.  Ultimately, the SEC determined that an Enforcement Action was not necessary, however it issued a report laying out how the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act applies to The DAO and similar entities.

Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits entities not registered with the SEC from engaging in the offer or sale of securities in interstate commerce.  Upon investigation of the circumstances surrounding The DAO, the SEC stated that The DAO qualifies as an “issuer” and thus must register as such with the SEC in order to sell DAO Tokens – which the SEC considers to be securities – in compliance with federal securities laws.  Given the SEC’s flexible interpretation and application of the Act, this Report is a caution to virtual entities that the federal securities laws are applicable and that the SEC intends to pursue enforcement of these laws in the field of virtual currencies and securities.

Initial Coin Offerings and the Securities Environment

A new financial instrument is arising in the capital markets and it provides both benefits and challenges to the equity environment. Variously denominated as initial coin offerings, crowdsales, token launches, and crowdfunding, this mechanism, rather than offering equity in a start-up venture, offers discounts on cryptocurrencies before they become available on the several exchanges.

Such offerings are made into a fraught landscape where they risk being interpreted as securities offerings that are subject to regulation, oversight, and enforcement by the Securities Exchange Commission. While the innovative characteristics of digital currency ought be encouraged, the SEC may, for reasons I explore in this note, be inclined to bring this device within their purview.

ICOs generally hold their offerings to be outside the conventional definition of securities and, so, outside the legal framework applicable to securities. Nevertheless, there is an expressed sense in the marketplace that government regulation of cryptocurrency will be necessary for the mechanism to be fully utilized.

This paper will review briefly two reasons that U.S. law will likely conclude that cryptocurrency is a security subject to the American regulatory scheme, First, I argue that the offerings made via ICOs are in effect, if not name, securities subject to the associated law. Second, I present my view that the Securities Exchange Commission is likely to find it to be in the public interest to conclude that digital currencies should be characterized as securities.

  1.     The Offering of Digital Currencies by Companies Seeking to Raise Capital Fits the Legal

Construct of a Security

The law defining securities, for purposes of federal regulation, has evolved in considerable nuance and complexity. The Securities Act of 1933 rather quaintly defines a “security” as

any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security,” or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 uses a somewhat similar definition.

Section 5 of the Securities Act makes it unlawful to offer or sell any security unless a registration statements is in effect for that security or there is an exemption from registration available. That section also requires the use of a statutorily prescribed prospectus document.

Finance is, in the practice, much more intricate than the plain language of the statutes appears to acknowledge, and, so, the courts have articulated considerable law particular to a wide range of circumstances encountered in application an in an evolving industry. Controlling these interpretations is the Supreme Court case SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. That case articulated both the priority of substance over form in evaluating whether a device is a security, as well as a test consisting of four distinct elements:

The first Howey test looks for an investment of money into some enterprise. Court cases has since broadened that notion to include any form of consideration;

Such an investment must be made into a common enterprise. Court rulings have articulated both “horizontal commonality” and “vertical commonality.”

Horizontal commonality describes the pooling of value from several investors who share in the profits and risks. Most circuits that have considered the issue of what is a common enterprise find it satisfied where a movant shows horizontal commonality, that is the pooling of investors’ funds as a result of which the individual investors share all the risks and benefits of the business enterprise] These circuits focus on whether the scheme involves a “pooling” of assets. For the common enterprise test to be satisfied, horizontal commonality requires that an investor’s assets be joined with another investor’s assets into a joint venture where each investor shares the risk of profit and loss according to their individual investment.

Vertical commonality is split into “Narrow” verticality and “Broad” verticality.

  1. The narrow vertical view is held by the Ninth Circuit. The narrow vertical approach finds a common enterprise if there is a correlation between the fortunes of an investor and a promoter. Under narrow vertical commonality a common enterprise is a venture in which the fortunes of the investor are connected with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment. It is not necessary that the funds of investors are pooled; what must be shown is that the fortunes of the investors are linked with those of the promoters, thereby establishing the requisite element of vertical commonality. Thus, a common enterprise exists if a direct correlation has been established between success or failure of the promoter’s efforts and success or failure of the investment. Under this view, the test is satisfied if the promoter and the investor are both exposed to risk and the profits and losses of investor and promoter are correlated.
  2.   The broad verticality test finds a common enterprise if the success of an investor depends on a promoter’s expertise. “Broad vertical commonality … only requires a movant to show that the investors are dependent upon the expertise or efforts of the investment promoter for their returns.” The Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit (because of the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of pre-split Fifth Circuit opinions) both follow this view. These courts focus on the expertise of the promoter in the industry of the alleged security. If the investor relies on the promoter’s expertise, then the transaction or scheme represents a common enterprise and satisfies the second prong of the Howey test.

The third prong of the Howey test requires an expectation of profits. Profits can be in the form of a cash return on the principal investment, capital appreciation, dividends, interest, or other earnings. For purposes of the Howey test, “profits” mean return to the investor, and not to the success of the enterprise. For example, a Ponzi scheme has no possibility of real prosperity, but certainly involves a security. This test looks to the motivation of the investor.

The fourth test in Howey calls for the expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of the promoter or some third party. The efforts of the promoter or third party must have a clear role in the success or failure of the enterprise.

We can examine just what it is that ICOs are offering by reviewing their descriptive so-called “White Papers” which offer the promoters’ outlines of the business model and goals of the enterprises. I have reviewed dozens of such white papers and find these elements in common among them:

-A description of the rapid growth presently occurring in the market space the enterprise proposes to enter

-A description of the unique value proposition the enterprise claims to possess (generally using rhetoric focused on results, rather than specific methods and always couched in highly technical language

-Many falsely claim their descriptive language or process is trademarked or otherwise lawfully protected from cooption

-In return for the solicited investment, the promotions offer early or discounted access to some form of digital currency, sometimes the promoter’s own brand of such digital currency

-A vague growth model is postulated, based on such things as “activity” within the proposed business ecosystem, transaction fees derived from cyptocurrency trades, or growth of other users’ participation in the system itself

-Investment in the offering is virtually always through some existing digital currency or, in some cases, precious metals, such as gold

I found no ICO White Paper that did not articulate, or at least imply, satisfaction of all four of the Howey tests for a security. Most satisfied both the horizontal and both vertical tests for a common enterprise. Often, the efforts by promoters to avoid using language they might have considered admissions of Howey criteria worked to render the rhetoric of those white papers cumbersome and incomplete.

In short, the promoters of ICOs conspicuously promote their own skills, insight, and claims to exclusive intellectual property as the value drivers of the enterprise upon which their respective enterprises will generate returns to investors, whose pooled investments are sought to capitalize the business. While nearly all of the white papers I reviewed were cautious to avoid references to specific return values or rates investors might expect, without exception, they all make repeated mentions of “profits” or some synonym thereof By either direct evidence, or by implication, then, these ICO white papers describe “securities” that meet the Howey tests.

  1.     The Digital Currency Market Space Exhibits Characteristics Which May Make it a Good

Subject of Regulation

The statutory authority to regulate these offerings aside, the SEC has an imperative to examine them in detail. Indeed, the SEC has, on more than one occasion, suggested that digital offerings are securities.

At least two other U.S. supervisory entities have articulated their views that digital currencies are subject, to varying extents, regulatory oversight.

The Commodities Futures Trading Commission has designated bitcoin as a commodity, subjecting it to the CFTC’s trading rules. As well, the IRS has characterized cryptocurrency as “property” and not “currency,” thereby disqualifying it for treatment with exchange gain or loss under Reg. §1.988-2.

The argument that the marketplace will serve to govern itself in this sector is somewhat belied by the fact that the marketplace in Bitcoin does not operate with an even hand.

As shown in Figure 1, the volatility of the conversion price of the pairs of Bitcoin/U.S. Dollar and Bitcoin/China Yuan has been growing at a faster rate for the Yuan than for the Dollar, especially since April of 2017. This has created a structural opportunity for arbitrage and can leave investors subject to unregulated speculation in cryptocurrency. Given that bitcoin and similar devices trade anonymously, the opportunity to generate large profits, outside the purview of the tax authorities, could, no doubt, attract any number of participants with obscure intent to the marketplace.

The attraction of a market so apparently open to manipulation by substantial participants may also be worth consideration.